|
Table 1. Overview of the World Economic Outlook
Projections |
(Percent change
unless noted otherwise) |
|
|
Year over Year |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Difference from April 2013 WEO
Published |
|
Q4 over Q4 |
|
|
Projections |
|
|
Estimates |
Projections |
|
2011 |
2012 |
2013 |
2014 |
|
2013 |
2014 |
|
2012 |
2013 |
2014 |
|
World Output 1/ |
3.9 |
3.1 |
3.1 |
3.8 |
|
0.2 |
0.2 |
|
2.6 |
3.5 |
3.7 |
Advanced Economies |
1.7 |
1.2 |
1.2 |
2.1 |
|
0.1 |
0.2 |
|
0.7 |
1.8 |
2.2 |
United
States |
1.8 |
2.2 |
1.7 |
2.7 |
|
0.2 |
0.2 |
|
1.7 |
2.0 |
3.1 |
Euro
Area |
1.5 |
0.6 |
0.6 |
0.9 |
|
0.2 |
0.1 |
|
1.0 |
0.3 |
1.1 |
Germany |
3.1 |
0.9 |
0.3 |
1.3 |
|
0.3 |
0.1 |
|
0.3 |
1.1 |
1.2 |
France |
2.0 |
0.0 |
0.2 |
0.8 |
|
0.1 |
0.0 |
|
0.3 |
0.5 |
0.6 |
Italy |
0.4 |
2.4 |
1.8 |
0.7 |
|
0.3 |
0.2 |
|
2.8 |
0.9 |
1.4 |
Spain |
0.4 |
1.4 |
1.6 |
0.0 |
|
0.0 |
0.7 |
|
1.9 |
0.7 |
0.0 |
Japan |
0.6 |
1.9 |
2.0 |
1.2 |
|
0.5 |
0.3 |
|
0.4 |
3.5 |
0.2 |
United
Kingdom |
1.0 |
0.3 |
0.9 |
1.5 |
|
0.3 |
0.0 |
|
0.2 |
1.1 |
1.7 |
Canada |
2.5 |
1.7 |
1.7 |
2.2 |
|
0.2 |
0.2 |
|
1.0 |
2.0 |
2.4 |
Other
Advanced Economies 2/ |
3.3 |
1.8 |
2.3 |
3.3 |
|
0.1 |
0.1 |
|
2.0 |
3.0 |
3.2 |
Emerging Market and Developing Economies 3/ |
6.2 |
4.9 |
5.0 |
5.4 |
|
0.3 |
0.3 |
|
5.0 |
5.6 |
5.6 |
Central
and Eastern Europe |
5.4 |
1.4 |
2.2 |
2.8 |
|
0.0 |
0.0 |
|
0.8 |
3.6 |
2.5 |
Commonwealth of Independent States |
4.8 |
3.4 |
2.8 |
3.6 |
|
0.6 |
0.4 |
|
1.3 |
3.3 |
2.9 |
Russia |
4.3 |
3.4 |
2.5 |
3.3 |
|
0.9 |
0.5 |
|
2.0 |
3.6 |
2.5 |
Excluding Russia |
6.1 |
3.3 |
3.5 |
4.3 |
|
0.0 |
0.3 |
|
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
Developing Asia |
7.8 |
6.5 |
6.9 |
7.0 |
|
0.3 |
0.3 |
|
6.9 |
7.0 |
7.0 |
China |
9.3 |
7.8 |
7.8 |
7.7 |
|
0.3 |
0.6 |
|
7.9 |
7.9 |
7.6 |
India 4/ |
6.3 |
3.2 |
5.6 |
6.3 |
|
0.2 |
0.1 |
|
3.0 |
6.0 |
6.6 |
ASEAN-5
5/ |
4.5 |
6.1 |
5.6 |
5.7 |
|
0.3 |
0.2 |
|
9.1 |
5.5 |
5.1 |
Latin
America and the Caribbean |
4.6 |
3.0 |
3.0 |
3.4 |
|
0.4 |
0.5 |
|
2.8 |
2.9 |
3.5 |
Brazil |
2.7 |
0.9 |
2.5 |
3.2 |
|
0.5 |
0.8 |
|
1.4 |
2.6 |
3.5 |
Mexico |
3.9 |
3.9 |
2.9 |
3.2 |
|
0.5 |
0.2 |
|
3.3 |
3.6 |
2.4 |
Middle
East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan |
3.9 |
4.4 |
3.1 |
3.7 |
|
0.1 |
0.0 |
|
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
Sub-Saharan Africa |
5.4 |
4.9 |
5.1 |
5.9 |
|
0.4 |
0.2 |
|
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
South
Africa |
3.5 |
2.5 |
2.0 |
2.9 |
|
0.8 |
0.4 |
|
2.3 |
2.3 |
3.0 |
Memorandum |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
European
Union |
1.7 |
0.2 |
0.1 |
1.2 |
|
0.1 |
0.1 |
|
0.6 |
0.7 |
1.3 |
Middle
East and North Africa |
4.0 |
4.5 |
3.0 |
3.7 |
|
0.1 |
0.1 |
|
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
World
Growth Based on Market Exchange Rates |
2.9 |
2.4 |
2.4 |
3.2 |
|
0.1 |
0.2 |
|
1.8 |
2.8 |
3.1 |
World Trade Volume (goods and services) |
6.0 |
2.5 |
3.1 |
5.4 |
|
0.5 |
0.1 |
|
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
Imports |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Advanced
Economies |
4.7 |
1.1 |
1.4 |
4.3 |
|
0.8 |
0.1 |
|
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
Emerging
Market and Developing Economies |
8.7 |
5.0 |
6.0 |
7.3 |
|
0.2 |
0.0 |
|
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
Exports |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Advanced
Economies |
5.6 |
2.0 |
2.4 |
4.7 |
|
0.4 |
0.2 |
|
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
Emerging
Market and Developing Economies |
6.4 |
3.6 |
4.3 |
6.3 |
|
0.5 |
0.2 |
|
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
Commodity Prices (U.S. dollars) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Oil 6/ |
31.6 |
1.0 |
4.7 |
4.7 |
|
2.4 |
0.2 |
|
1.2 |
4.1 |
3.8 |
Nonfuel
(average based on world commodity export weights) |
17.9 |
9.9 |
1.8 |
4.3 |
|
0.9 |
0.0 |
|
1.2 |
4.5 |
2.3 |
Consumer Prices |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Advanced
Economies |
2.7 |
2.0 |
1.5 |
1.9 |
|
0.1 |
0.0 |
|
1.8 |
1.6 |
2.1 |
Emerging
Market and Developing Economies 3/ |
7.1 |
6.1 |
6.0 |
5.5 |
|
0.1 |
0.1 |
|
5.2 |
5.4 |
4.9 |
London Interbank Offered Rate (percent) 7/ |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
On U.S.
Dollar Deposits |
0.5 |
0.7 |
0.5 |
0.7 |
|
0.0 |
0.1 |
|
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
On Euro
Deposits |
1.4 |
0.6 |
0.2 |
0.4 |
|
0.0 |
0.1 |
|
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
On
Japanese Yen Deposits |
0.3 |
0.3 |
0.3 |
0.3 |
|
0.0 |
0.1 |
|
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
|
Note: Real effective exchange rates
are assumed to remain constant at the levels
prevailing during May 6June 3, 2013. When economies
are not listed alphabetically, they are ordered on
the basis of economic size. The aggregated quarterly
data are seasonally adjusted.
1/ The quarterly estimates and projections account
for 90 percent of the world purchasing-power-parity
weights.
2/ Excludes the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, United Kingdom, United States) and euro area
countries.
3/ The quarterly estimates and projections account
for approximately 80 percent of the emerging market
and developing economies.
4/ For India, all data and forecasts (quarterly and
annual) are presented on a fiscal year basis in the
July 2013 WEO, whereas data were presented on a
calendar year basis in the April 2013 WEO. However,
the difference between the April 2013 WEO and
current 201314 growth projections for India was
adjusted to be on a fiscal year basis.
5/ Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and
Vietnam.
6/ Simple average of prices of U.K. Brent, Dubai
Fateh, and West Texas Intermediate crude oil. The
average price of oil in U.S. dollars a barrel was
$105.01 in 2012; the assumed price based on futures
markets is $100.09 in 2013 and $95.36 in 2014.
7/ Six-month rate for the United States and Japan.
Three-month rate for the euro area. |
|
At 5 percent in 2013 and about 5½ percent in 2014, growth in
emerging market and developing economies is now
expected to evolve at a more moderate pace, some ¼ percentage
points slower than in the April 2013 WEO. This embodies weaker
prospects across all regions. In China, growth will average 7¾
percent in 2013-14, ¼ and ½ percentage points lower in 2013 and
2014, respectively, than the April 2013 forecast. Forecasts for
the remaining BRICS have been revised down as well, by ¼ to ¾
percentage points. The outlook for many commodity exporters
(including those among the BRICS) has also deteriorated due to
lower commodity prices. Growth in sub-Saharan Africa will be
weaker, as some of its largest economies (Nigeria, South Africa)
struggle with domestic problems and weaker external demand.
Growth in some economies in the Middle East and North Africa
remains weak because of difficult political and economic
transitions.
In sum, global growth will recover from
slightly above 3 percent in 2013 to 3¾ percent in 2014, some ¼
percent weaker for both years than the April 2013 projections.
Downside risks, old and new, still dominate the outlook.
Although imminent tail risks in advanced economies have
diminished, additional measures will be needed to keep them at
bay, including timely increases in the U.S. debt ceiling and
continued do what it takes action by the euro area authorities
to avoid a sharp deterioration in financial conditions. In
contrast, risks of a longer growth slowdown in emerging market
economies have now increased, due to protracted effects of
domestic capacity constraints, slowing credit growth, and weak
external conditions.
The forecasts assume that the recent rise in financial market
volatility and the associated yield increases will partly
reverse, as they largely reflect a one-off repricing of risk due
to the changing growth outlook for emerging market economies and
temporary uncertainty about the exit from monetary policy
stimulus in the United States. However, if underlying
vulnerabilities lead to additional portfolio shifts, further
yield increases, and continued higher volatility, the result
could be sustained capital flow reversals and lower growth in
emerging economies.
Policies to Generate Strong Growth
Weaker growth prospects and new risks raise new challenges to
global growth and employment, and global rebalancing.
Policymakers everywhere need to increase efforts to ensure
robust growth.
As stressed in previous WEO reports, key advanced
economies should pursue a policy mix that supports
near-term growth, anchored by credible plans for medium-term
public debt sustainability. This would also allow for more
gradual near-term fiscal adjustment. With low inflation and
sizable economic slack, monetary policy stimulus should continue
until the recovery is well established. Potential adverse
side-effects should be contained with regulatory and
macroprudential policies. Clear communication on the eventual
exit from monetary stimulus will help reduce volatility in
global financial markets. Further progress in financial sector
restructuring and reform is needed to recapitalize and
restructure bank balance sheets and improve monetary policy
transmission.
In the euro area, a bank asset review should
identify problem assets and quantify capital needs, supported by
ESM direct recapitalization where appropriate. Building on
recent agreements, policymakers should also make progress to a
fuller banking union, including through a strong Single
Resolution Mechanism. Policies to reduce financial market
fragmentation, support demand, and reform product and labor
markets are also crucial for stronger growth and job creation.
Cyclical positions and vulnerabilities vary across
emerging market and developing economies, but prospects
of monetary policy normalization in the United States and a
potential capital flow reversal have heightened some policy
trade-offs. Risks of lower-than-expected potential output in
some economies suggest that there may be less fiscal policy
space than previously estimated. Monetary easing can be the
first line of defense against downside risks, as inflation is
generally expected to moderate in most economies. However, real
policy rates are low already, and capital outflows and price
effects from exchange rate depreciation may also constrain
further easing. With weaker growth prospects and potential
legacy problems from a prolonged period of rapid credit growth,
the policy framework must be ready to handle possible increases
in financial stability risks. While macroeconomic policies can
support these efforts, the main instruments should be regulatory
oversight and macroprudential policies.
Finally, the above measures need to be supported by
structural reforms across all major economies
to lift global growth and support global rebalancing. As before,
this implies measures to sustainably raise consumption (China)
and investment (Germany) in surplus economies, as well as
measures that improve competitiveness in deficit economies.